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Andrew David Irvine (born July 14, 1958) is a Canadian academic who teaches at the University of British Columbia. He holds a PhD in philosophy from Sydney University and is Head of Economics, Philosophy and Political Science at UBC Okanagan. He is a past vice-chair of the (UBC Board of Governors ), a past president of the British Columbia Civil Liberties Association, and a member of the board of directors of the Society for Academic Freedom and Scholarship. He has held visiting positions at several Canadian and American universities and has been recognized as one of British Columbia’s most influential public intellectuals.〔Douglas Todd, “Who are B.C.’s Biggest Thinkers? Meet the Top 50,” ''Vancouver Sun'', 25 August 2000, A1, A12〕 == Academic work == Often cited for his work on the twentieth-century philosopher Bertrand Russell,〔Giannis Triantafillou, “Bertrand Russell is Relevant even Today,” ''Eleftherotipia'' (Greece), 21 January 2010〕〔Juan Ignacio Rodriguez Medina, “Las buenas razones de Bertrand Russell,” ''Il Mercurio'' (Chile), 19 August 2012〕〔Anon., “Guides to Russell’s Writings,” Bertrand Russell Archives, 29 November 2010, http://www.mcmaster.ca/russdocs/writings.htm〕 Irvine has argued in favour of physicalism〔James Robert Brown, “Logic, Epistemology, Philosophy of Science,” ''The Canadian Encyclopedia'', 2012, http://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.com/articles/logic-epistemology-philosophy-of-science〕 and against several commonly held views in the history of modern philosophy, including the claim that Gottlob Frege succeeded in developing a workable theory of mathematical platonism〔Andrew David Irvine, “Frege on Number Properties,” ''Studia Logica'', vol. 96 (2010), 239-60〕 and the claim that Bertrand Russell was an advocate of epistemic logicism,〔Andrew David Irvine, “Epistemic Logicism and Russell’s Regressive Method,” ''Philosophical Studies'', vol. 55 (1989), 303-27〕〔Andrew David Irvine, “Russell on Method,” in Godehard Link (ed.), ''One Hundred Years of Russell’s Paradox'', Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter Publishing Company, 2004, 481-500〕 a claim that one commentator has concluded is now “thoroughly debunked.”〔Conor Mayo-Wilson, “Russell on Logicism and Coherence,” ''Russell: the Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies'', vol. 31 (2011), 66; for a less sympathetic appraisal, see Anders Kraal, “The Aim of Russell's Early Logicism: A Reinterpretation,” ''Synthese'', vol. 191 (2014), 1493-1510〕 He has defended a two-box solution to Newcomb’s problem in which he abandons “the (false) assumption that past observed frequency is an infallible guide to probability”〔Andrew David Irvine, “How Braess’ Paradox Solves Newcomb’s Problem,” ''International Studies in the Philosophy of Science'', vol. 7 (1993), 141-60 at 157〕 and a non-cognitivist solution to the liar paradox, noting that “formal criteria alone will inevitably prove insufficient” for determining whether individual sentence tokens have meaning.〔Andrew David Irvine, “Gaps, Gluts, and Paradox,” ''Canadian Journal of Philosophy'', supplementary vol. 18 (of the A priori'' ) (1992), 273-99 at 294〕 In modal logic (which studies theories of possibility and necessity), he has argued in favour of the non-normal system S7, rather than more traditional systems such as S4 or S5.〔Andrew David Irvine, “S7,” ''Journal of Applied Logic'', vol. 11 (2013), 523-529〕 Unlike other systems, S7 allows logicians to choose between competing logics, each of which, if true, would be necessarily true, but none of which are necessarily the correct system of necessary truths. As Irvine puts it, “just as being ''physically possible'' means nothing more than being consistent with the laws of physics, being ''logically possible'' means nothing more than being consistent with the laws of logic. However, this leaves open the question of which logic and which consistency relation are to be adopted. S7 gives us the language to discuss the possible denial of necessary truths. S7 gives us the language to assert not only that some propositions really are necessary; it gives us the language also to note that their denials, although impossible, remain possibly possible.”〔Andrew David Irvine, “S7,” ''Journal of Applied Logic'', vol. 11 (2013), 527〕 In other words, there is a mechanism in which even sets of necessary truths can be compared to their alternatives. 抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 ■ウィキペディアで「Andrew David Irvine」の詳細全文を読む スポンサード リンク
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